

Indian Education Sector (IES)



Can this elephant dance?

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Born Intelligent...Killed by Education!

- Contrivance from an Albert Einstein Quote

If You Think Education is Expensive...Try Ignorance!

- Derek Bok (President of Harvard University - 1971 till 1990)



Indian Education

Demand

>

Supply

=

VALUE

Demand

(at any price)

>


Supply

=

WEALTH



There is demand...



Rs 100,000

Cost of my entire 15 years of education up to post graduation (1976-1993)


Rs 100,000

Fees I pay for my daughter's pre-school & kindergarten



...and there is VALUE...

Price of education has increased by 3-6x over the last decade



Source: Industry



...and then there is PERCEIVED value (fear psychosis)

“Why do people send their kids to coaching classes, after having paid Rs100,000 per year for education in the most premier institutes”

Hunt for nothing but ‘the best’

- 8,000 applications for 300 seats in Bombay Scottish School (a premier school in Mumbai)



There are RETURNS...the highest IRR business (LEGAL) of all times

Education spend - Rs pa	1984-2004	1990-2009
Pre-school	200	8,000
Kindergarten	600	30,000
Primary Education - Std I - IV	1,400	100,000
Secondary Education - Std V - X	3,600	240,000
Graduation - Engineering	172,000	200,000
Post Graduation - MBA	125,000	200,000
Coaching classes	20,000	50,000
Total spending	322,800	828,000
First Salary p.a.	575,000	1,500,000
Payback	Less than a year	..yet less than a year



IES: Largest Supply = Worst Supply!

India has 3rd largest education system globally

Network of >1m schools and 18,000 higher education institutes (HEIs)

Spends at 3.7% of GDP

Not even 1% of the US\$30bn that govt spends on education is on capex!

40% of students enrolled in private schools - accounting for just 7% of capacity



Perpetual
Demand

+

Inelastic
Pricing

+

Perceived
Value

+

Inefficient
Supply

IES - a US\$ 80bn Space



Private IES alone a USD85bn opportunity by 2012E...

(\$ m)	Revenues (2009)	Revenues (2012E)	CAGR (%)
Formal IES	45,200	65,250	13
K12	22,800	33,779	14
Higher Education*	22,400	31,470	12
Non-formal IES	11,930	19,608	18
Preschool	408	1,026	36
Multimedia -private sch.	112	459	60
ICT in govt. schools	153	752	70
Coaching classes	7,360	11,194	15
Vocational training	1,875	3,662	25
Books	1,925	2,516	10
Total IES	57,125	84,858	14



IES - an interesting class...

IES - The Largest

Largest Capitalization

- Largest capitalized space in India at over \$80bn!

Largest Supply

- Third largest education system globally!

Largest Demand

- Largest population within the 0-24 years age group globally!

Inefficiencies - The Highest

Insufficient funds

- India spends 5.2% of global spends on education on 20% of world population

Inefficient supply

- 40% of the student base enrolled in private schools (7% of the network)

Lowest enrollments, highest dropouts

- A mere 37% net enrolled in K-12
- Lowest GER* globally of 9.97 at higher education level

Investability Quotient (IQ) - The Lowest

\$45bn: 'overregulated & under-governed'


- For 80% of the private spends (formal IES), regulations (not-for-profit mandate) a big deterrent
- Low political will to bring about the much required structural change

\$12bn: Scores low on scalability

- For remaining 20% (non-formal IES), scalability remains a big issue



...but investments at a mere US\$300m!



Private formal education (USD45bn)

- 'regulation' is the Big Bully

Non-formal education (USD12bn)

- 'scalability' an issue



Formal IES - pain points of investing

Overregulated & under-governed

Multiple level structures (no central body); PPPs do not offer returns or autonomy!

Trust issues

Not-for-profit structure; all surpluses to be ploughed back

Political quagmire

High political lineage (75% of HEIs owned by politicians); little 'will' to change the existing structure

Land blues







Hoarding of land reserved for educational institutes for resale; high land prices make economics unviable

FDI clarity

100% FDI allowed; but no incentives or regulations in place



Non-formal IES - scalability an issue

	Current size	Growth	Non - regulated	Scalability	Value creation	Largest player - still small!	Comment
Preschool	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	 (Rs251m)	More organized participation; scalability through franchisee route
Multimedia in private schools	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	 (Rs6,370m)	Annuity business model
ICT in govt schools	x	✓	✓	✓	x	 Rs6,370m)	Low on economic viability
Coaching Classes	✓	✓	✓	x	x	 Rs1,200m	People driven - model cannot be spammed!
Vocational Training	x	✓	✓	x	x	 Rs11,486m	Highly fragmented
Books	x	x	✓	x	x	 Rs5,152m	Low-growth market (reusability at 70%)

Non-formal IES - Less than 5% of the \$12bn segment offers scalability



IES - De novo



We ask a few questions

Is the education system 'over-regulated and under-governed'?

Can the government achieve the goal of universalization of quality education alone?

Is the current trust structure dysfunctional?

Privatization of education...are we there yet?

PPP - can education be the next 'power' play?

Can India become a global hub for education?



What needs to change?

- ✓ Reduce hierarchical multiplicity of governing bodies; morph into a quality controller (such as SEBI or TRAI)
- ✓ Encourage private participation via monetary benefits and autonomy to run institutions
- ✓ Institutionalize the 'dysfunctional structures'
- ✓ Focus on quality and allow 'profiteering'. Use private participation to increase R&D and further inclusive growth
- ✓ Define PPP models leading to sustainable IRRs for players; hand over management control
- ✓ Incentivize and institutionalize the process to set up foreign universities beyond just allowing 100% FDI in education on paper



Is IES 'over-regulated and under-governed'?

There is very little co-ordination among the statutory bodies in respect of degree durations, approval mechanisms, accreditation processes, etc. It sometimes leads to very embarrassing situations in which we find two regulatory agencies at loggerheads and fighting legal cases against each other

- An excerpt from the Yash Pal committee report

Government needs to reduce hierarchical multiplicity of governing bodies; needs to morph into a Quality Controller (such as SEBI or TRAI)



Is the govt capable of universalizing quality education on its own?

The Centre's budgetary allocation is up 6x in the 11th Plan; the Govt spends a whopping \$30bn on education (3.5% of GDP, at the global average) AND YET...

...India has one of the lowest GERs (general enrollment ratios) globally!

...40% of the total student base is enrolled in private schools - 7% of total capacity!

...only 0.85% of the \$30bn spend is on capital expenditure! ~80% spent on teacher's salaries...and yet a dearth of quantity and quality wrt teachers


IDFC-SSKI Research

Need to encourage private participation through monetary benefits and autonomy to run institutions




Trust issues: Is the current trust structure dysfunctional?

Convolutd trust structures and black money in the system?



- EduInfra owns the real estate and leases it out to schools
- Edu Manage - provides IP and management services



- MU - Manipal Universal Learning is the corporate entity which provides services to students
- SMU (provider of distance education) runs as a trust

Need to institutionalize these 'age old' structures



Privatization of education...are we there yet?

‘We cannot have companies that are listed on the stock exchange and have educational institutions and pay dividends to shareholders from the fees that parents pay in their institutions. We cannot allow education to be subject to risk factors’

Kapil Sibal, HRD Minister

Focus on quality and allow ‘profiteering’; use private participation to increase R&D and further inclusive growth



PPP - can education be the next 'power' play?

ICT and labs in schools

- Allocated Rs130bn under SSA. Plans to implement ICT in 90,000 schools in the current 5-year plan
- Allocated Rs11.43bn under RMSA to create science and math labs in government schools

Model schools

- Government-PPP initiatives - extending the spectrum from \$100m to \$1bn...
- 2500 schools out of the 6,000 model schools are declared under PPP (a Rs36bn opportunity; private investment of ~Rs100bn is expected to flow in)

Vocational training

- National Skill Development Corporation allocated Rs10bn in 2009-10 interim budget; plans to raise Rs150bn going forward

Need to define models leading to sustainable IRRs for players; hand over management control to the players



Can India become a global hub for education?

‘India spends US\$13bn on education annually outside the country!’

- Assocham

‘India could, in time, develop into an education hub. Then, the most reputed institutions in the world too would be keen to test the Indian waters...

... Adherence to Indian laws, including on reservation, will be one of the pre-requisite conditions for foreign universities interested in setting-up their campuses’

Kapil Sibal, HRD Minister

*Need to incentivize and institutionalize the process
to set up foreign universities in India*



How should one play IES?

With 80% of IES (\$45bn formal IES) stuck within the regulatory diktat and non-scalability of the non-formal space (\$12bn), the gargantuan potential is trapped...




Spaces to bet on

	Current size	Growth	Non Regulated	Scalability	Value creation	Comment
Preschool	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	Euro Kids (50% stake acquired by Educomp) and Kangaroo Kids are the relevant players
K-12	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	Innovative structures evolving; Educomp Solutions and a host of private players looking to acquire scale
HE	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	Innovative structures evolving; a long term game; Manipal Universal Learning the only investable player
Multimedia in private schools	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	Annuity business model; Educomp Solutions has first mover advantage
ICT in govt schools	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	L1 bidding and a long receivables cycle
Coaching Classes	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	80% of the market difficult to scale!
Vocational Training	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	NIIT the only scaled-up model
Books	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	Low-growth market (reusability at 70%)



What do we look for in players?



4Cs differentiate the 'men' from boys



IES report card: Players to bet on

Company	Creativity	Content	Capital	Creditability	IQ
Educomp Solutions	●	●	●	●	●
NIIT	◐	◐	●	◐	◐
Everonn Systems	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐
Manipal Education	●	◐	●	●	●

Comparative valuations

Company	Price	Mkt Cap	Reco	EPS CAGR (FY09-10E)	FY11E		Target	Upside
	(Rs)	(Rs bn)		(%)	PER (x)	EV/EBITDA (x)	(Rs)	(%)
Educomp Solutions	709	67	Neutral	62.9	18.8	11.8	755	6.5
Everonn Education	398	6.0	Outperformer	50.1	10.5	5.1	600	50.8
NIIT	68	11.2	Neutral	17.3	12.0	7.3	75	10.3

* nos include share of associate

With few 'relevant' players above the \$20m mark, Educomp Solutions and Manipal Universal Learning are the two scaled-up and annuity businesses that have high IQ!




Educomp Solutions (Neutral)

Price - Rs709
Mkt cap - Rs67bn

- ✓ Smart Class (50% of revenues; 70% of EBIT)- Trump Card
 - Implemented in 2,574 schools till date - order book size at ~Rs10bn (market share >45%).
 - Management plans to touch 25,000 schools over the next 6-7 years - add 2,500 schools in FY11 and 500 schools in Q4FY10 itself.
 - Average revenue per school to be ~30% lower than earlier expectations
 - New model to 'free up' balance sheet for growth - upfront booking of revenues (over 2 years as against over 5 years earlier) through sale of BOOT contracts to 3rd party vendor 'Edu-Smart'
- ✓ ICT (18% of revenues; 9.3% of EBIT)- low returns
 - Implemented in 14,826 schools till date
 - High debtor days and L1 bidding
- ✓ K12 - Creating a longer-term annuity
 - 36 schools under operations (14 under Eurokids)
 - Target of 150 schools by FY12 (50% owned; 50% dry management)
 - The business expected to be free cash flow negative for the next 4-5 years
- ✓ New business - losses remain a moniterbale
 - Loss of ~Rs350m in FY10
 - Investments to continue - ~Rs500m over the next 12-18 months

Structural changes



Key financials

As on 31 March	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10E	FY11E
Net Sales	1,101	2,861	6,370	10,740	12,653
Adj. net profit (Rs m)	286	706	1,344	2,641	3,566
Share in issue (mn)	16	17	17.3	94.5	94.5
EPS (Rs)	17.9	40.9	77.7	27.9	37.7
EPS growth (%)	105.2	128.8	90.0	(64.1)	35.0
PE (x)	198.2	86.6	45.6	25.4	18.8
Price/ BV(x)	49.4	21.2	14.6	5.2	4.1
EV/ EBITDA (x)	112.2	48.7	22.5	12.8	11.8
RoE (%)	27.9	33.9	37.8	31.1	24.4
RoCE (%)	23.2	20.1	21.4	19.7	19.7

*numbers include the impact of securitization and new accounting mechanism)



Everonn Education (Outperformer)

Price - Rs398
Mkt cap - Rs6bn

- ✓ VITELS (52% of revenue; 61% of EBITDA) - Traction in growth; business model moving towards annuity
 - Present in 867 schools and 1,396 colleges
 - Robust additions in schools (stickiness in revenues); introduction of compulsory courses in colleges (short-term optional non-annuity based revenues)
 - Improving mix towards high margin/ annuity creating businesses


- ✓ ICT (33% of revenues; 37% of EBITDA) - low RoCE
 - Presence in 5,862 schools
 - Order book of Rs1.34bn executable in next five years
 - High debtor days, L1 bidding

- ✓ More value...not just vanilla; poor proxy 'education' and Educomp
 - 51% EPS CAGR over FY09-11E
 - RoCE to rise from 18.4% in FY09 to 24.7% in FY11E
 - At 10x FY11E earnings, there is a valuation arbitrage.

Key financials

As on 31 March	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10E	FY11E
Net sales (Rs m)	430	916	1,436	2,483	3,273
Adj. net profit (Rs m)	41	138	253	402	571
Shares in issue (m)	10	14	15	15	15
Adj. EPS (Rs)	4.0	10.0	16.8	26.6	37.8
% change	-	152.0	68.1	58.7	42.0
PE (x)	100.7	40.0	23.8	15.0	10.5
Price/ Book (x)	11.2	5.9	2.8	2.4	1.9
EV/ EBITDA (x)	24.0	16.7	11.2	7.1	5.1
RoE (%)	22.3	21.2	16.4	17.0	20.1
RoCE (%)	25.2	22.3	18.4	21.6	24.7

Shareholding pattern



- ✓ ILS - Individual Learning Solutions (35% of revenues; 71% of EBITDA)
 - Recovery in IT - Revenues expected to show 12% CAGR over FY09-11E
 - New Businesses to breakeven in FY11

- ✓ SLS - School Learning Solutions (12% of revenues; 17% of EBITDA)
 - Business mix - 70% in ICT (government schools)
 - Inability to cash in on \$1.5bn multimedia in private schools market

- ✓ CLS - Corporate Learning Solutions (50% of revenues; 15% of EBITDA)
 - Low on growth


- ✓ Plans to raise capital - Rs2bn through a QIP and convertible warrants worth Rs300m to promoters
- ✓ 'Recovery' priced in the stock price - 17x core EPS (ex associate)

Key financials

As on 31 March	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10E	FY11E
Net sales (Rs m)	7,951	10,068	11,486	12,223	13,848
Adj. net profit (Rs m)	573	756	673	666	925
Shares in issue (m)	99	165	165	165	165
Adj. EPS (Rs)*	5.8	4.6	4.1	4.0	5.6
% change		(20.9)	(11.2)	(1.0)	38.8
PE (x)	11.7	14.7	16.6	16.8	12.1
Price/ Book (x)	2.1	2.8	2.3	2.3	2.0
EV/ EBITDA (x)	10.9	12.0	11.7	9.6	7.3
RoE (%)	36.4	21.1	15.3	13.8	17.7
RoCE (%)	11.0	8.5	7.5	8.3	11.5


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Shareholding pattern




Manipal Universal Learning

- ✓ Manipal Universal Learning (MUL) - corporate entity of the Manipal Education Group (India's largest private player in the higher education space)
- ✓ Gross revenues of ~Rs8bn (54% through international businesses)
- ✓ The only formal education player in India to have received sponsor-funding - \$30m from IDFC Private Equity and \$40m from Capital
- ✓ Recently acquired 100 acres of land in Jaipur, Rajasthan
- ✓ Reforms required in the education space remains an overhang



Manipal Universal Learning (corporate structure)



My parents told me, "Finish your dinner. People in China and India are starving."

I tell my daughters, "Finish your homework. People in India and China are starving for your job."

-Thomas L. Friedman

New York Times columnist and Pulitzer prize winner - and writer of "The World is Flat..."



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